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Comment
On 5 September 2019, Advocate General (‘AG’) Bobek delivered his Opinion in the Budapest Bank case following a
request for a preliminary ruling from the Hungarian Supreme Court (‘HSC’). [1] AG Bobek advised on several matters
such as the existence of an obligation for National Competition Authorities (‘NCAs’) to expressly indicate which
type of collusion they condemn and whether the facilitating, accepting and implementing of an agreement
amounts to a concerted practice. However, this Opinion is particularly interesting because of the clari cation it
brings to the analytical framework to assess whether a practice could be considered a ‘by object’ restriction.
I . The Parties
Six of the banks involved in the main proceedings intervened in Luxembourg: Budapest Bank Nyrt. (state owned),
ING Bank NV Magyarországi Fióktelepe (ING Group), OTP Bank Nyrt. (OTP Group), Kereskedelmi és Hitelbank Zrt.
(KBC Bank and Insurance Group), Magyar Külkereskedelmi Bank Zrt., Erste Bank Hungary Zrt. (Erste Group). In
addition, both Visa Europe Ltd and MasterCard Europe SA intervened.
I I . The Facts
On 24 April 1996, seven banks – members of Visa’s and MasterCard’s credit card systems – reached an
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agreement setting a uniform multilateral interchange fee (‘MIF Agreement’). A MIF is the amount paid by an
acquiring bank to an issuing bank every time a credit card transaction takes place.
On 31 January 2008, the Hungarian Competition Authority (‘HCA’) initiated an investigation into the MIF Agreement
and, a little more than a year later, the HCA concluded that it constituted a restriction of competition ‘by object’. In
addition, the HCA held that the Agreement also constituted a restriction of competition ‘by effect’ and imposed
fines totalling 1,922 million Hungarian forint (approx. EUR 5.7 million) on the seven banks that initially concluded the
MIF Agreement as well as on Visa and MasterCard.
After their appeal against the decision was rejected in rst instance, Visa and six of the ned banks appealed to
the Budapest High Court, which partially annulled the contested decision and ordered the HCA to conduct a new
investigation. According to the High Court, it was not possible for the HCA to qualify the same agreement both as a
restriction of competition ‘by object’ and ‘by effect’. Besides, it arrived at the conclusion that the Agreement did not
constitute a restriction ‘by object’.
The HCA then lodged a further appeal against the annulment of its decision with the HSC. Left in doubt, the HSC
decided to stay the proceedings and referred a number of questions concerning the proper interpretation of Article
101 TFEU to the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’):
Can a practice be qualified as both restrictive ‘by object’ and ‘by effect’?
Can the MIF Agreement at issue be qualified as a restriction ‘by object’?
Is it necessary to differentiate between participation in an agreement and acting in concert?
Can Visa and MasterCard be held liable while they were not a direct party to the MIF Agreement?
I I I . The Opinion
Same conduct can be classif ied as restricting competition ‘by object’  and ‘by ef fect’
In relation to the rst question, AG Bobek advices the CJEU to rule that it is possible to classify the same conduct
to restrict competition both ‘by object’ and ‘by effect’ at the same time.
In line with logic and aim of Article 101(1) TFEU
AG Bobek starts his reasoning by indicating that, in line with (formal) logic, the ‘or’ contained in Article 101(1) TFEU
should be understood as an (inclusive) disjunction. This understanding is supported by the overall aim and purpose
of Article 101(1) TFEU, which is formulated broadly and aims to catch all forms of collusion, regardless of their aim
and subject matter.
In addition, there are no ontological differences between agreements that are anticompetitive ‘by object’ or ‘by
effect’. From a substantive point of view, they both restrict competition in the internal market and should as a
principle be forbidden. This understanding goes back to the LTM judgment rendered in 1966. [2] It was then that
the CJEU pointed out that the use of the disjunctive conjunction ‘or’ means that a competition authority should rst
consider the object of an agreement. Where an examination of this object ‘does not reveal the effect on
competition to be sufficiently deleterious, the consequences of the agreement should then be considered’.
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Procedural distinction
AG Bobek contends that the object/effect dichotomy is essentially nothing more than a ‘procedural device’ “meant
to guide the competition authority on the analysis to be carried out under Article 101(1) TFEU depending on the
circumstances of the case”. It allows a competition authority to not carry out a fully- edged analysis of the effects
of an agreement that “b y [its] very nature can be regarded to be harmful to the proper functioning of normal
competition” because those agreements “may be considered so likely to have negative effects […] that it may be
considered redundant, for the purposes of applying Article 101(1) TFEU to prove that they have actual effects on
the market.” [3] The object/effect dichotomy should thus be understood as an e ciency tool aimed at optimizing
the resources of authorities, not as a device to force authorities into fitting an agreement into the right box.
Consequently, this procedural dichotomy does not prevent authorities to qualify an agreement as being restricting
‘by object’ and ‘by effect’ as these are not intrinsically different. Of course on the condition that the requirements
for both quali cations are ful lled.  [4] AG Bobek indicates that this practice may be justi ed by reasons of
procedural e ciency  “if the anticompetitive object of an agreement is controversial, it may be ‘safer’ for the
authority, in case of subsequent litigation, to demonstrate that the agreement is also anticompetitive by effect”. In
other words, if an authority is not su ciently convinced that a ‘by object’ quali cation would be upheld when
tested in court, it can be a reasonable approach – from a procedural e ciency point of view – to also establish
that the practice is restrictive ‘by effect’.
Elements to take into account to assess whether (MIF)  agreements can be deemed to restrict
competition ‘by object’
By the second question, the CJEU was asked to clarify whether the MIF Agreement constitutes a restriction of
competition ‘by object’ under Article 101(1) TFEU. AG Bobek starts with a disclaimer warning the CJEU of the
impossibility to provide a clear-cut answer to this question since the referring court is the only one that possesses
the necessary information and expertise to fully understand the MIF Agreement. However, the AG suggests some
guidance and criteria as to how the referring court should conduct its review.
Restrictions ‘by object’ unwrapped: a practical guide applying a two-step analysis
The AG starts his reasoning by recalling that the ‘by object’ quali cation should be interpreted restrictively and be
limited to “certain types of coordination between undertakings which reveal a su cient degree of harm  to
competition and for which it is thus unnecessary to examine their effects”. [5]
AG Bobek continues by providing some fundamental practical guidance to assess whether a restriction can be
qualified as ‘by object’. It is AG Bobek’s understanding of the case law that competition authorities should carry out
a two-step analysis:
First, they should focus on the content of the provisions in the agreement and its objectives. The key aim of this
procedural step is to “ascertain whether the agreement in question falls within a category of agreements
whose harmful nature is, in light of experience, commonly accepted and easily identifiable”.
In a second step, the authority should check if there are any legal or economic contextual circumstances which
may call into question the presumed anticompetitive nature of said agreement. To AG Bobek it is crystal clear
that an analysis of the legal and economic context is required even when an agreement appears to constitute a
restriction ‘by object’. [6] In his opinion, the assessment of a practice under EU competition rules cannot be
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made in the abstract. In this regard, he states that “a purely formal assessment of an agreement, completely
detached from reality, could lead to condemning innocuous or procompetitive agreements” . When required to
switch from ‘by object’ to ‘by effect’ analysis: prima facie plausible procompetitive explanation
AG Bobek advices that if there are elements that make it prima facie plausible that there is an alternative
procompetitive rationale to an agreement, an analysis of its effects becomes necessary. In others words, in the
event that the context analysis does cast doubt on the presumed harmful nature, then the competition authority
has no other choice but to conduct a fully fledged analysis of the effects of the agreement. [7]
In this regard, AG Bobek notes that the legal standard is that of prima facie plausibility, i.e., the countervailing
explanation must seem plausible enough at first sight to warrant further examination but it does not need to be fully
established , argued, and proven as this is a matter for the fully edged effects analysis. [8] So once persuaded
that an agreement is a plausible source of procompetitive effects, this agreement can no longer be quali ed as
restrictive ‘by object’.
Boundary between ‘context analysis’ and ‘fully fledged effects analysis’: no clear-cut answer
In relation to the second step, AG Bobek recognizes that a key question is: “Where does the second step in the by
object analysis stop and the by effect analysis begin?”. AG Bobek aims to provide an answer to this still unresolved
issue by stressing that the context analysis does not amount to a de facto ‘by effect’ analysis, but should be
considered a “basic reality check” that “simply requires the competition authority to check, at a general level,
whether there are any legal or factual circumstances that preclude the agreement or practice in question from
restricting competition”.
However, AG Bobek concludes by indicating that he cannot answer where the exact boundary between a ‘context
analysis’ and a ‘fully edged effects analysis’ lies as it is impossible to draw, in abstract terms, a bright line
between the second step of an object analysis and an effects analysis. The difference between the two is thus
more one of degree than of kind. However, in the AG’s opinion this does not impact his conclusion that “ if the
elements that the authority observes when looking at the legal and economic context of an agreement alleged to
constitute a restriction ‘by object’ point in different directions, an analysis of its effects becomes necessary”.
To illustrate this, the AG uses the following metaphor “ if it looks like a sh and it smells like a sh, one can
assume that it is sh. Unless, at the rst sight, there is something rather odd about this particular sh, such as that
it has no ns, it oats in the air, or it smells like a lily, no detailed dissection of that sh is necessary in order to
qualify it as such. If, however, there is something out of the ordinary about the sh in question, it may still be
classified as a fish, but only after a detailed examination of the creature in question.”
Assessment of the HCA’s analysis of the MIF Agreement
The AG criticizes the HCA’s analysis on various points. First, the AG indicates that a given practice can only amount
to a restriction ‘by object’ when the alleged infringement is ‘clearly defined and explained’. In this case there seems
to be a lack of precision in relation to the type of competitive harm that can result from the MIF Agreement, how the
various affected markets may interact, the changes that took place on these markets over time, etc.
Second, authorities arguing for a ‘by object’ restriction should put forward a ‘reliable and robust wealth of
experience regarding the concerned agreements’. The AG questions whether such bank of experience exists in
relation to the concerned practices.
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Third, it has been argued that the MIF Agreement also had some procompetitive effects. In this regard, the AG
indicates that it is for the referring court to examine those claims to check whether they are credible enough to
warrant closer scrutiny.
No need to expressly indicate the type of  collusion
In relation to the third question, AG Bobek suggests to answer that it is not required that a competition authority
expressly indicates whether an undertaking’s conduct constitutes an agreement or a concerted practice. AG Bobek
departs from the point of view that it is unreasonable and unnecessary to characterise a specific form of behaviour
as either an agreement or a concerted practice since the legal analysis to be carried out under Article 101(1) TFEU
is the same regardless of the characterisation.
Facilitating,  accepting and implementing an agreement amounts to a concerted practice
With regard to the nal question, AG Bobek argues that it is su cient for the credit card companies and banks that
were parties to the MIF Agreement to reach the threshold of a concerted practice to hold the former responsible for
the alleged infringement. He clari es that this conclusion is not altered by the fact that the credit card companies
and the banks operate in a different market, nor by the fact that the contribution of the credit card companies to the
infringement was relatively smaller than the contribution of the banks.
IV. Comment
The main achievement of AG Bobek’s Opinion is that it aims to establish a functional analytical framework to
assess whether or not a practice should be considered a restriction ‘by object’. In our opinion, he succeeds in its
goal by offering authorities the practical two-step analytical framework set-out above. It has to be seen whether
the CJEU will confirm the framework suggested by the AG.
In addition, and mainly in relation to the second step of the test, the AG offers the following obvious and ‘less
obvious / novel’ teachings.
Obvious teaching – an assessment of a practice can never be made in the abstract
The AG con rms established case law that the anticompetitive nature of a practice should always be sense tested
against the “legal and economic context in which [it] was implemented”. [9] Only if the anticompetitive nature of the
practice cannot be called into question by the context, a ‘by object’ qualification will be appropriate.
Less obvious / novel teaching – boundary between ‘context analysis’ and ‘fully edged effects analysis’: no clear-
cut answer
The AG attempts to clarify where the ‘context analysis’ stops and the ‘by effect analysis’ begins to come to the
conclusion that it is impossible to draw, in abstract terms, a bright line.
However, with his ‘ shes and lilies’ metaphor, it can be said that he partially addresses the grievances from some
critics who compare the quali cation practice of competition authorities to inductive reasoning tests as the ‘duck
test’ (“if it looks like a duck, swims like a duck and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck”) or the ‘elephant
test’ (“it is di cult to describe, but you know it when you see it ”). The AG’s metaphor adds to these tests that “ if
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[…], there is something rather odd about this particular sh [duck / elephant], such as that it has no ns [duck beak
/ trunk], it oats in the air, or it smells like a lily, […], it may still be classi ed as a sh [duck / elephant], but only
after a detailed examination of the creature in question.”
Less obvious / novel teaching – threshold to switch from ‘by object’ to ‘by effect’ analysis: prima facie plausible
procompetitive explanation
The answer to the question: ‘what legal standard has to be met to call into question the anticompetitive nature of a
practice?’ could have the biggest impact in practice. The AG advices that to put the anticompetitive nature of a
practice into question, an undertaking will have to provide a prima facie plausible procompetitive rationale for the
implemented practice. In other words, the invoked countervailing explanation will have to seem plausible enough at
first sight to warrant further examination but it does not need to be fully established, argued, and proven as this is a
matter for the fully fledged effects analysis.
In case the CJEU upholds AG Bobek’s Opinion – in similar clear wording –, this would nally con rm that a ‘by
object’ quali cation is only appropriate if an undertaking cannot refer to any procompetitive purpose for a practice
considered anticompetitive by its nature. [10] However, even in this case, it remains to been seen whether the
CJEU will con rm the legal standard – ‘prima facie plausible’ – that a procompetitive purpose invoked by an
undertaking has to meet before it can be upheld. We feel that the way to go would be to con rm this rather easy to
meet standard as this would underline the exceptional nature of ‘by object’ restriction as underlined in Cartes
Bancaires.
The importance of such guidance cannot be underestimated as the distinction between anti-competitive practices
that are restrictive ‘by object’ and those that are restrictive ‘by effect’ is key for the allocation of the burden of proof
between authorities and the concerned parties. [11]
[1] AG Opinion of 5 September 2019, Budapest Bank and Others, C-228/18, EU:C:2019:678.
[2] Judgment of 30 June 1966, Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm, C-56/65,
EU:C:1966:38.
[3] Judgment of 11 September 2014, Cartes Bancaires v Commission, C-67/13 P,
EU:C:2014:2204, §50-51 and Judgment of 26 November 2015, Maxima Latvija, C-345/14,
EU:C:2015:784, §19.
[4] In this regard, the AG indicates that the existence of alternative legal boxes is no licence for
vagueness. Authorities still need to adduce the necessary evidence for both types of restriction and,
additionally, evaluate and clearly subsume that evidence under the appropriate legal categories.
[5] Judgment of 11 September 2014, Cartes Bancaires v Commission, C-67/13 P,
EU:C:2014:2204, §58.
[6] Under ‘legal and economic context’, account should be taken of the nature of the goods or
services affected, the real conditions of the functioning and structure of the markets in question
and, where relevant, the parties’ intention. See amongst others judgment of 26 September
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2018, Infineon Technologies v Commission, C‑99/17 P, EU:C:2018:773, §156 and the case-law
cited.
[7] When doing an effect analysis, “the authority has to compare the competitive structure in themarket caused by the agreement under scrutiny, with the competitive structure which would haveprevailed in its absence. The analysis cannot, therefore, stop at the mere capability of the agreementto negatively affect competition in the relevant market, but must determine whether the neteffects of the agreement on the market are positive or negative.”
[8] The quantification of these procompetitive effects takes places at a later stage – under Article
101(3) TFEU – once the anticompetitive effects are established.
[9] Legal and economic context entails the nature of the goods or services affected, the real
conditions of the functioning and structure of the markets in question and, where relevant, the
parties’ intention.
[10] The same idea was already put forward by AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in 2017 but not explicitly
confirmed by the CJEU. See Simon Troch, Lucille Geraerts, “The EU Court of Justice AdvocateGeneral Saugmandsgaard Øe indicates that providing misleading information aimed at underminingthe reputation of one drug to the benefit of another drug might constitute a restriction byobject (Hoffmann-La Roche)”, 21 September 2017, e-Competitions Bulletin September 2017, Art.
N° 85409.
[11] Ibid. and Simon Troch, Cecilia Sbrolli, “The EU Court of Justice rules on limited exclusivityrestriction in lease agreements and concludes that it is not a restriction by object (Maxima Latvija)”,
26 November 2015, e-Competitions Bulletin November 2015, Art. N° 78000.
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